

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ANALYSIS
ADDITIONAL SKILL IDENTIFIER

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ABSTRACT

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ANALYSIS ADDITIONAL SKILL IDENTIFIER, by MAJ Kelly J. Snyder, 93 pages.

In order to keep pace with the post-Cold War military, the Army needs to formally recognize changes required in the analytical arena. New requirements to effectively analyze the economic, political, social and cultural, and religious influences on a population are now being levied upon analysts at every level. This type of analysis is critical when dealing with the now prevalent military operations other than war (MOOTW). The ability to readily identify soldiers with analytical backgrounds in MOOTW-specific areas is not currently inherent in the system. Thus the central research question is: Should the U.S. Army have an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) for MOOTW analysts? An initial literature review of lessons learned from previous MOOTW deployments identified the need for specific analysis of economic, political, social and cultural, and religious aspects. The second phase, a review of current curricula, identified a lack of emphasis on MOOTW analysis training. The final phase, a survey of commanders and analysts involved in MOOTW deployments, resulted in all of the respondents concluding that the Army must emphasize MOOTW training to at least a moderate if not greater extent. Until all analysts are MOOTW trained and readily available to every commander, an interim ASI is necessary.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACE	analysis and control element
ACT	analysis and control team
ANOVA	analysis of variance
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army regulation
ASI	additional skill identifier
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CFD	career field designator
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officers College
CINC	commander-in-chief
DSN	Defense Switching Network
FM	field manual
IBCT	interim brigade combat team
INTELST	intelligence server
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
JP	joint publication
LIC	low intensity conflict
MDMP	military decision making plan

METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations

MI military intelligence

MMAS	Master of Military Art and Science
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MOS	military occupational specialty
MTW	major theater war
NIST	national intelligence support team
OOTW	operations other than war
OPFOR	opposing forces
OPLAN	operational plans
PKO	peace keeping operations
ROE	rules of engagement
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UN	United Nations
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Should the U.S. Army have an additional skill identifier (ASI) for military operations other than war (MOOTW) analysts? This thesis, using input from previously published works and data from soldiers and commanders in the field, will attempt to answer this very valid question.

The Army, based on input from many analysts, operators, and commanders this author queried over the past several months, does a poor job in providing analytical analysis tools to its personnel. These tools are essential to effectively analyze the economic, political, social and cultural, and religious influences on a population. This type of analysis is critical when dealing with peacekeeping, peacemaking, and other forms of MOOTW. In order to provide commanders with viable courses of action to maintain peace, these aspects must be understood, analyzed, and acknowledged. Enemy military tactics and doctrine are no longer the major concern in many operations being faced by the U.S. Army. However, a quick review of any military curriculum will show that the Army continues to focus the majority of its training on mainly warfighting skills.

In order to keep pace with this post-Cold War military, the Army must consider many additional issues. Throughout military history, civilian needs and safety often took a “back seat” to military operations. Civilians were mainly viewed as a nuisance, with refugees often clogging

lines of communication and main supply routes. They were usually pushed off the routes and told to fend for themselves, but to stay out of the way.

The refugee problem is still an issue in MOOTW; however, with the increasing emphasis on human rights, the Army can no longer just bypass these issues. The military as a whole is now focusing more on the entire makeup of the country or countries in question. Therefore, the nonmilitary aspects of a population must be addressed in greater detail. Some steps have been taken in the new Army FM 3-0, *Operations*, to include these nonmilitary aspects by adding a new category into mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Although this is a start, the Army still has a long way to go in this arena.

The “civilian” problem became apparent to this author in Bosnia during OPERATION JOINT FORGE, August 1998 to July 1999. The necessity to provide more to the commander than the military threat was quickly assessed by the entire staff. Careful tracking of economic stability and political posturing, in addition to understanding the cultural and religious influences on the major players of each of the factions, was essential.

The consensus throughout this author’s tour with 1st Cavalry Division (the headquarters of which served as Task Force Eagle during OPERATION JOINT FORGE) was that the center of gravity for the Bosnian people was money. Being able to track it, figure out who had it, and where it was coming from and going to, greatly aided in identification of key players. Those who had the money were those in power, either legitimately or illegitimately. Black marketing was an extensive problem for the peacekeepers, but accounted for a large portion of

the economy at the time. The Task Force Eagle staff was fortunate in that an economist had been called to active duty from the Army Reserves. His databases and methods of tracking economic indicators greatly enhanced the analytical abilities in this area. However, without his expertise, the intelligence community at Eagle Base would have been extremely disadvantaged or ill prepared.

Task Force Eagle's analysis and control element (ACE) (an analytical cell which is part of the intelligence staff and controls intelligence collection as well as analyzing information from all sources to create intelligence for the commander) also spent great amounts of time creating link diagrams to show the relationships between key players (often referred to as mugs, thugs, and wackos by the commander and staff). These link diagrams provided the commander with a visual portrayal of how the power flowed in the country. They also helped identify who needed to be "leaned on" for information and who could provide needed influence over certain groups or personnel that allied forces needed to control.

In addition to these economic and political factors, religious and cultural differences also played a major part in the ongoing dispute in Bosnia. Without understanding these differences, the analysts could not predict for the commander how the different entities would react to actions by the U.S. or other nations. This inability to analyze and predict "enemy" actions renders any intelligence analyst virtually useless.

This information, provided by the ACE, aided in the planning and conduct of allied missions throughout the deployment. Whether it involved operations to secure illegal weapons or picking up persons indicted for war crimes, intelligence provided the foundation for the plan.

These intelligence aspects greatly assisted all the planners on the Task Force Eagle staff. A full understanding of the political environment, how the black market affected a region, and whether the people in a given area were Bosniac, Serb, or Croat allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of the total situation, and in turn, a better course of action for the commander.

The necessity to consider nonmilitary aspects is also essential in other theaters for MOOTW. The Joint Intelligence Center at United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), which functions much the same as an ACE, just in a joint community, also had need of this type of analysis. In an analysis of operations in South America, economics and the ability to track personalities, drug lords, and dirty politicians, in particular, play a large part. Other concerns in this area of the world are often humanitarian. Hurricane relief missions prevail throughout the Caribbean and in the northern regions of South America. The missions involve a definite requirement for understanding the population, the economy, and the infrastructure of the countries under USSOUTHCOM purview.

To truly address the issue at hand, several secondary questions must be answered. The first secondary question involves to what extent this type of analysis is currently trained in military schools. A subset of this question would be how many soldiers already possess these skills. It is possible that the U.S. Army already feels it has adequate personnel within the foreign area officer program who are trained to conduct an analysis on religious, social, and cultural influences on a specific population. If this is the case, then perhaps a better way to track or manage these personnel, down to the tactical level, to ensure that their skills are available during

MOOTW is needed. The next question involves the scope of this training. Should all analysts be trained? Should all military members sent on MOOTW deployments be given a basic understanding of these nonmilitary aspects? Does the Army need only a minimal number of experts who could train those with a “need to know?” The new interim brigade combat team (IBCT) concept will also have an effect on this scope. If the only analysts available to the commander are those young privates and specialists in the analysis and control team (ACT), should they also have a basic understanding of these aspects?

Tertiary questions to consider deal primarily with those items which must be trained. Can the Army cover all aspects necessary to truly understand a population in the four previously mentioned categories of economic stability, political posturing, cultural influences, and religious influences? Are other categories needed, such as language or history? Can the religious and or social categories be omitted and still provide commanders with enough information about how the “enemy” will react based only on political and economic infrastructures? These questions all have a direct bearing on whether or not these skills are vital enough to the military to recognize with an ASI.

Several assumptions have been made in the initial thought process upon which this thesis is based. The most obvious one is the assumption that the Army will continue to be involved heavily in MOOTW. If President George W. Bush opts to confine the military to more of a warfighting, vice MOOTW role, this thesis may not be as relevant as it appears at present. During the elections, President Bush ran on a campaign containing a disclaimer that “nation

building” by the military must stop. If the President convinces Congress that this is not a good use for the military, then MOOTW may drastically reduce.

The assumption is also made that, should the military deem these skills essential to the mission, an ASI would suffice. This would be in contrast to creating a new military occupational specialty (MOS), or just adding the requirements to an existing MOS or career field designator (CFD). Additional considerations include that this may be a job better suited to civilian analysts or agencies, or that it will not be covered by reserve forces, another branch, or nation with which the U.S. routinely operates.

An understanding of the four main aspects is essential to fully comprehend this topic. The first aspect is economic. This is defined as anything dealing with money or the financial health of a population. The second aspect is political posturing. This involves any ruling or governing body, recognized as sovereign by the population, which affects their lives by creating and enforcing laws. This can also include nonlegitimized or sanctioned organizations which effect control over the people. Examples of these nonlegitimized forces may include such groups as drug warlords, terrorists, and street gangs. The third aspect is very broad. The social and cultural aspects include those items which distinguish one people from any other. This includes hereditary predispositions, habits, traditions, skills, and behaviors. The final aspect is religious. For the purpose of this thesis, this aspect is defined as any faith, philosophy, belief, or system, based on some form of deity, which in its precepts, expects its members to behave in a specific manner.

The definition of an ASI is specified in AR 611-1, *Military Occupational Classification Structure Development and Implementation*, and states: “ASI are primarily used to identify skills requiring formal school training or civilian certification. Specialized skills identified by the ASI include . . . procedures, analytical methods, . . . other techniques and similar required skills that are too restrictive in scope to comprise an MOS” (U.S. Department of the Army 1997, 6.8).

Another term which must be understood is “intelligence.” This is best defined as any analyzed information necessary for the commander to accomplish the assigned mission. This was derived from an article called “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: Definitions and Limitations” which was found in the November-December 1995 issue of *Peacekeeping and International Relations*. It states that intelligence “refers to that select portion of information that is necessary for leaders at all levels of command to make decisions. To be more precise, intelligence refers to information relevant to a government’s formulating and implementing policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats to those interests from actual or potential adversaries” (Graham 1995, 1).

The final term is MOOTW. As defined in Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, “MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises” (United States Department of the Army 1995, I1). These operations involve a broad spectrum and include anything that does not have, as its initial goal, the application of tactical force against an enemy military. These can include such operations as humanitarian missions, disaster relief missions,

counterdrug, peacekeeping, peacemaking, noncombatant evacuations, and counterterrorism. They generally have a lower national priority, do not involve full mobilization, and usually are not approved by Congress. However, Joint Pub 3-07 stresses that “political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical” (United States Department of the Army 1995, I1). (Thus, an even stronger argument for an understanding of political analysis, both enemy and friendly.) Conversely, military successes or failures in MOOTW have a direct impact on political considerations for the future of the operation and possibly even for continued military activities in that theater.

There are several limitations to this thesis. Due to time available and the large number of MOOTW operations which the Army has been involved in, examples will be limited to those which have occurred between 1995 and 2000. This thesis will also remain at the unclassified level to ensure it can be widely disseminated. This will undoubtedly limit the ability to address the full scope of the problem which occurs at higher classification levels. This topic is relevant enough that it must be addressed by a wide audience and should not be limited by clearance issues. In addition, based on the sources that are available, it can be more than adequately addressed in the unclassified realm.

Another limitation to be considered is the ability to get responses from commanders and analysts who are participating in or have participated in operations of this type. This author’s experiences and contacts made in Bosnia will undoubtedly yield more responses than queries to the commanders in general. This could skew the results to the Bosnian experience in particular. Every effort will be made to contact a variety of commanders, at all levels, and from as many

conflicts as possible which have occurred over the past five years. Foreign commanders may also be interviewed. For instance, there is an Army major from New Zealand at the Command and General Staff Officers College (CGSOC) who has command experience in East Timor. He received U.S. intelligence support during the operation. His feelings about the support he received from the intelligence community will also provide valuable input. Although other foreign officers in the class may be interviewed, there will be no attempt to contact additional foreign officers for their input.

As far as delimitations are concerned, this thesis will not attempt to address ASI specific issues. It is not intended to create a curriculum or even identify letter designators for this position. The intent is merely to leave the specific requirements up to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) if it becomes apparent that this ASI is needed. There is also no intent to specify or limit the field of competitors for the ASI. The intent is not to suggest that this be a Military Intelligence (MI) specific field. There are many talented officers and enlisted personnel in other branches who would be excellent candidates for this type of analysis. Identifying the best instructors to teach these skills will also be left up to TRADOC. The proponent for the whole program may not even be the U.S. Army. Perhaps it will be decided, that if an ASI of this nature is deemed appropriate, that it will be a joint effort. The intent of this thesis is not to address these issues, but to merely show, by example and commanders' needs, that these skills are relevant and needed in a much greater density for the variety of operations in which the military is expected to participate.

Although examples will be cited from sister services and even foreign experiences with intelligence in peacekeeping operations, the intent is not to find a solution to their problems. The focus is on the United States Army. All operations addressed in this thesis, in consideration of intelligence oversight regulations which prohibit the Army from conducting intelligence collection against U.S. citizens, occur on foreign soil and target non-U.S. personnel. The MOOTW activities within the United States and its territories, such as humanitarian aid or disaster assistance missions, would not require significant intelligence support as the commander would already be familiar with economic, political, cultural, and religious aspects of his own country.

This study is significant to the Army in that it addresses the need to formally recognize the changes required in this post-Cold War period in the analytical arena. If these additional analytical techniques are not recognized and taught on a larger scale, the Army will continue to find itself at a disadvantage during MOOTW. Without formalizing this requirement and putting it into the training base, it will not get the emphasis it demands in order to allow the Army to function effectively in these varied conflicts. Even Sun Tzu, thousands of years ago, wrote that one has to “know your enemy” (Wu 1877, online) in order to defeat him. Why does the Army continue to focus training efforts, almost exclusively, on a conventional enemy when most of the missions no longer stress tactical operations?

This topic, if acknowledged by the Army as valid, could drastically change the way analysts are trained. It could require massive changes to existing curricula in military schools or possibly the creation of new ones. This, in a period of limited resources, both fiscal and personnel, will be of major significance. However, this thesis will show that more emphasis on

training is essential in this arena. The Army must “know its enemy,” even if that enemy is a politician, a religious sect, or a drug lord with nothing but his own wealth in mind.

This could change the entire way the Army looks at the battlefield. The new Army FM 3-0, *Operations*, although moving away from the linear battlefield of the Cold War and incorporating METT-TC, still concentrates its efforts against some form of an organized military. In MOOTW the fight could be against totally unorganized civilians armed with pitchforks. It has been found, time and again, that heavy tactics do not work in guerilla warfare-type situations. In order for the commander to devise new tactics, plans, and procedures which will work in a MOOTW situation, he must understand his enemy. By identifying where the weak points are, the analyst can provide the commander with intelligence that can be used to craft viable courses of action to accomplish his mission. Whether those weak points are in a defensive line or in a wimpy politician who could be co-opted to assist the commander in his goals, the analyst must be able to make them clear to the commander. That is where this type of analysis becomes significant.

The need for this type of analysis is not new. There is a wealth of information and lessons learned which have been published during the past five years involving intelligence analysis support to MOOTW. In the next chapter this information will be summarized to provide a better understanding of the scope and nature of this requirement.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a wealth of information on lessons learned from the past five years worth of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and counterdrug operations. Many of these lessons address the difficulty inherent in analyzing these operations. The political and cultural aspects in particular proved difficult for the military forces to fully comprehend and work within. Even during Operation Desert Storm, an understanding of the cultural differences was essential to the conduct of operations. Desert Storm was obviously not considered an operation other than war, but even then it was apparent that understanding of coalition partners and the social, cultural, and religious aspects of the AOR were critical to operations. The need for analyzing the full spectrum has become more and more evident as the emphasis on military-on-military operations has shifted to MOOTW.

An article in *World Affairs*, summer 1996, titled “U.S. Intelligence Priorities in the Post-Cold War Era” addressed the changing nature of intelligence requirements. This article states “the focus of intelligence ranges from security issues to economic policy; it can address very broad matters, such as interpreting or predicting the behavior of a nation, or very specific issues or concerns, such as the behavior of an individual” (Weinrod 1996, 10). This type of intelligence analysis was not in the forefront during the Cold War. Analysis has become much more specialized, yet the community has not changed its focus to accommodate these new requirements.

The problem of MOOTW analysis is not specific to the Army, or even to the U.S. for that matter. The Navy and Marine Corps are struggling with this same issue. A *Marine Corps Gazette* article in April 1998 titled “Intelligent Life on the Planet MOOTW” states that “Gathering information to support MOOTW remains a limited practice in the intelligence community” (Polk 1998, 43). The Marines also realize that this type of analysis needs greater emphasis. The military’s concentration on the warfighter pulls intelligence assets away from this critical task. The article goes on to say “The low priority of MOOTW in the national strategy degrades the intelligence tasked to support it. Top priorities for the national intelligence community revolve around major theater war, weapons of mass destruction, and countries that have historically been a major threat to international or regional stability” (Polk 1998, 43). This concurs with the perception that something is needed to fill this gap.

Other countries are having similar concerns. Many of our allies are concerned with the need for specialized intelligence during peacekeeping operations. One article, in the October-December 1996 *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* titled “Intelligence and the United Nations: Lessons From Bosnia--A Canadian Experience,” states that the Canadian intelligence section was required to “follow the evolution of events both tactically inside and around the AOR [Area of Responsibility] and strategically-politically throughout the Balkans” (Villeneuve 1996, 24). Although the Canadians felt their intelligence cycle was “very flexible, lending itself easily to adaptation to any situation” (Villeneuve 1996, 24), they stressed the need for change.

The United Nations (UN) has even recognized the diverse requirements for intelligence support during operations of this nature. During the UN mission to the Congo commanders

required intelligence on the local situation which included “ethnic and religious division” (Graham 1995, 4) to plan their operations. The article did not say whether or not they felt they had done this successfully. The fact remains, however, that this is a far-reaching topic which affects many agencies involved in MOOTW.

Another source which addresses UN peacekeeping operations discussed the need for different types of intelligence. One whole chapter is devoted to types of peacekeeping intelligence required at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The introduction to these topics summed it up very well. It states:

The UN’s past attitudes toward and approaches to intelligence are not viable in such a context. Neither are Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and the current IW concepts wholly appropriate, since they are designed very largely for mid-high intensity combat operations. Instead, the most relevant approaches may be found in LIC [low intensity conflict] concepts. Therefore, it is essential to take a new look at intelligence requirements, sources, and methods, from a different, but not unfamiliar, perspective. (Charters 1999, 41)

Shifting back to U.S. intelligence, an article in *World Affairs*, summer of 1996 issue, titled “U.S. Intelligence Priorities in the post-Cold War Era,” states “intelligence agencies will need to develop improved ways of detecting, assessing, and responding to potential threats posed by paramilitary forces and even civilians” (Weinrod 1996, 5). Why, when this issue has been addressed for so many years, has the Army not done something to formalize this requirement? By creating a formal requirement for these skills, the Army could ensure that analysts are trained and available to provide this vital information to their commanders.

Also in 1996, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) conducted an extensive research program to determine requirements for analysis tools to support strategic and

operational-level MOOTW. This 300-page report goes into excruciating detail about how to conduct analysis of MOOTW at the upper (strategic and operational) echelons. Unfortunately, this study did nothing to focus on tactical level MOOTW analytical tools. Still, the author's point is valid that "OOTW [sic] analysis tools are embryonic or non-existent" (Hartley 1996, 1).

The USPACOM report goes on to cover fifty MOOTW attributes and determines which attributes can not be effectively covered with existing analytical tools. Although this report was staffed through all of the CINCs, there does not seem to be any mention of it again in later writings. Perhaps some of these ideas were incorporated into the thought process when writing new doctrine, however, it has never again been covered to this depth of detail.

Just a year later, "A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy" discussed the need to "develop political-military plans fully and in complete coordination with--and in such a way that they drive--the military planning process" (Kretchik 1997). How can the Army possibly do this without understanding the political structure of the country in which it is involved? This again points to the necessity for someone trained in other than warfighting analysis to be available during the planning for, and execution of, these types of operations.

The need for change was also noted in an article from the *Parameters*, winter 1998-1999 issue, which states that the Army must "be prepared to support relevant agencies in dealing with the political, economic, and social aftermath of the intrastate violence" (Manwaring 1998, 30). The Army cannot possibly provide that support without fully understanding the political, economic, or social aspects of the region.

This requirement has been recognized by more than just the intelligence community. In a book on Civil-Military relations written in 1998, the author discusses training soldiers for peacekeeping missions. He specifically states “Peacekeeping forces also need to be made aware of local culture and norms of behaviour” (Williams 1998, 73). A subject matter expert associated with the unit must understand this information in order to brief it to the soldiers.

Another example of the breadth of this problem is an article which was published in the *Army Times*. It involved an interview with the Chief of Infantry, Major General John Le Moyne. In this interview, he specifically states that “the military needs to improve its human intelligence capabilities so that commanders and troops are familiar with the peoples and cultures of the cities in which they are fighting” (Naylor 2000). Perhaps this will lead to doctrinal changes in the Infantry to better provide this type of information to all commanders.

Some of this requirement is covered in pre-existing Army and Joint doctrine. A good place to start is in Army FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. This manual emphasizes the need for an understanding of military and nonmilitary topics such as politics, economics, and demographics and notes that “success for the intelligence officer in peace operations depends on a thorough understanding of the situation” (U.S. Department of the Army 1994, 45). This must be defined as the whole situation, not just that of the enemy warfighting machine.

An additional Army manual, FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, states that in MOOTW the commander must understand “the diplomatic, economic, and social objectives of the operation before determining the military end state” (U.S.

Department of the Army 1995, 1-11). If the commander must understand these factors, so must his analysts.

In Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, it states:

Intelligence collection in MOOTW, however, might require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. Information collection and analysis in MOOTW must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. It will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment's peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervenor can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive, do in fact have the intended effect. (U.S. Department of the Army 1995, I-1)

A more current Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, also discusses the uniqueness of analysis in these operations. "MOOTW support must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. Population distribution patterns, ethnic divisions, religious beliefs, language divisions, tribe and clan loyalties, health hazards and political sympathies must all be considered for their effects on MOOTW" (U.S. Department of the Army 2000, V-6). Doctrine, both Army specific and joint, definitely recognizes the need for this form of analysis. Perhaps some way to formalize these requirements is necessary.

Although Army doctrine does a good job providing the "whats" it does little to address the "hows." A thesis from the Naval War College on "Joint Intelligence in Support of Peace Operations" addresses the hows in this manner: the analytical "architecture must be designed for simplicity and understanding in order to accommodate the complex mix of military, cultural, political, and economic factors that distinguish peace operations from the conventional combat

support role it was designed to serve” (Boyd 1996, iii). Again showing that, at least in the Navy, the need for change in the intelligence community is being considered as essential to support the commander in MOOTW.

Course curricula which currently teach MOOTW are another good source of information for this thesis. A section on MOOTW is included in the Operational Warfighting Course Book from the Command and General Staff College. It addresses the need for nontraditional information in order to plan for military operations other than war. Specific items include “continuous, real-time information on diplomatic and political aspects of the proposed operation” (Arnold 1994, L-2-C-4), and the need to “understand the political, economic, and social objectives of the operation” (Arnold 1994, L-2-C-4) prior to planning for it. This same course provides a checklist of things to consider when analyzing a MOOTW mission. This information is very helpful to provide a framework for analysis. Unfortunately, it is not taught to this level of detail to the junior analysts and young soldiers who are being required to provide this type of analysis to their commanders. In fact, intelligence for Support and Stability Operations training is a very short block at the Army’s primary analysis course at Fort Huachuca.

The literature cited above comes from a wide variety of sources. Many, such as Villeneuve and Graham, are primary source accounts of actual experiences in military operations other than war. These sources are both credible and factual in their dealings with the topic at hand and show a need for analysis of nontactical information. Chapter 4 of this thesis will

provide many more primary source accounts of the need for political, economic, cultural, and religious analysis.

Some of the sources, such as Manwaring and Kretchik, are secondary but based on research and comparison of other works. These sources provide an even broader basis upon which this thesis is built. Each of these individuals did their own research and came to their own conclusions. These conclusions supported the need for additional review of the subject and possible changes in the way the Army does MOOTW in the future.

The doctrinal references, particularly the cited joint publications, although not applicable to specific operations, are the general framework within which the intelligence community functions. These provide a basis with which the reader can better understand the requirements for analysis in this type of environment.

During exhaustive research, much was found about the need for this type of analysis. Models are even given in some course curricula, primarily from the Command and General Staff College, covering what should be analyzed during MOOTW. The level of competence of analysts involved in missions is seldom addressed. Without this vital information, it is difficult to determine whether this ASI, and the training which would precede it, is necessary.

This thesis will address the issue with data from the military community. Responses from both MOOTW intelligence consumers (commanders) and analysts who participated in MOOTW should help to fill this void. The next chapter will address how this survey is constructed and the types of quantifiable data which can be obtained in order to answer this question.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research for this thesis was conducted in three major phases. These phases consisted of research of previously existing works, review of existing course curricula and a comprehensive survey. The primary focus for this thesis are MOOTW events which occurred between January 1995 and the present. Each of these phases will be addressed in detail in this chapter so that the methodology for this thesis becomes clear.

The first phase was an exhaustive search of previously written material on the topic of MOOTW analysis and how the four aspects (economic, political, social and cultural, and religious) were involved in missions conducted during these operations. The research began with a bibliographic review by the librarians at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). Many sources were available on the general topic of intelligence support to MOOTW. These sources consisted primarily of articles in professional journals, however, several books have also been written on the topic. This bibliographic review also uncovered several previous Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) theses on peacekeeping operations, although most just touched on differences in analytical requirements.

After a thorough review of the sources provided by CARL, this author found the internet and digital databases from various institutions of higher learning, particularly those associated with the military, also provided good source material. Several sites which were especially useful were the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) web site and the Pro

Quest database collection. Both of these sites offered good, insightful articles from first person sources which had a direct link to this topic. Finally, general world wide web searches produced additional articles on analytical support to MOOTW. These articles were often based more on civilian support to the military, but also provided valid and thought provoking data.

The final step in this first phase consisted of a search of existing Army field manuals and joint doctrine. These manuals provided the current framework for analytical support to MOOTW as well as providing several vignettes and lessons learned from previous operations. This provided an excellent stepping-off place for the next step in the research design.

The second phase involved obtaining training materials from TRADOC of existing courses which deal with MOOTW operations and the analysis of these situations. This material helped determine the extent to which MOOTW analysis is already taught. In addition, the material and course descriptions provided a good view of whom is being taught to analyze these different factors. Identifying the trainees will greatly assist in determining to what level the military is emphasizing this topic. This identification will also help ascertain where soldiers previously trained in these vital skills are found within the Army.

An additional benefit from looking at existing training materials was derived by determining what exactly is being trained. This is an important factor in assessing if additional emphasis needs to be placed on the specific analysis of MOOTW. The understanding of what is currently considered important in the training base provided a good foundation to address this additional topic.

The third phase involved surveying commanders and analysts who participated in MOOTW deployments to determine how crucial these “nonmilitary” aspects were to their ability to conduct their missions. This data assisted in determining how many personnel are needed with these analytical skills, and whether an ASI would be an appropriate solution. The survey was approved by the Development and Assessment Division at CGSOC and assigned the tracking number 001104.

Commanders and analysts who have previously served in MOOTW operations and are current members of this CGSOC class were interviewed about their need for intelligence in their operations. The identification of personnel who fit in this category was obtained by sending out a classwide electronic mail requesting all those who were MOOTW commanders or analysts to respond. In addition, coordination was conducted with the international and U.S. student affairs offices to request their assistance in identifying those class members with MOOTW experience. Once contact was made with these personnel, they identified other commanders and analysts who could also provide answers to the survey. Use of the worldwide locator also assisted in obtaining addresses for these other personnel.

Several gaps were discovered in existing sources based on the literature review. The survey was created to attempt to fill these gaps. Specific questions which assisted in providing data for this research topic included the following:

1. What is your name, rank and branch?
2. What operation were you involved in?
3. What date did you deploy?

4. What date did you return?
5. At what level did you command?
6. To what extent did you need intelligence on areas of interest other than those normally associated with tactical military operations to command your unit?
7. To what extent did you need intelligence on the local economic situation?
8. To what extent did you need intelligence on the local political situation?
9. To what extent did you need intelligence on the local cultural and social aspects?
10. To what extent did you need intelligence on religious impacts?
11. How satisfied were you with the intelligence community's ability to provide you with required information in a complete and timely manner?
12. To what extent do you feel the Army should place emphasis on analysis of MOOTW?
13. Do you have additional comments in relation to this topic?
14. Who were other members of your organization who could provide feedback on this topic?

Commanders and analysts who were not resident CGSOC members were interviewed via Defense Switching Network (DSN), or electronic mail. They were asked the same questions. All commanders and analysts were given the option to add additional comments reference their intelligence support during their MOOTW experiences.

All of the responses collected from the survey were consolidated by operation and took into account commanders and analysts at all levels. Names were removed and all responses

were kept on a nonattributional basis. The data was then analyzed to determine if commanders were provided enough relevant intelligence, and if analysts felt prepared to provide the required information. If the commanders were satisfied, that information was captured so it can be formalized in training. Commanders that were not satisfied provided information on what more they needed. In addition, the data was used to determine patterns in the support received. The data shows how analytical support has varied over the past five years. It also shows the extent to which commanders feel that the intelligence community is providing them what they need in MOOTW operations.

Most of the survey was designed as a Likert-Type scale with possible responses including: not-at-all, slight extent, moderate extent, great extent and constantly. Administrative questions such as operation, name, rank, job and dates of deployment were a fill-in-the-blank format. Additional comments and requests for additional points of contact were short essay responses. These responses provided excellent quotations for this thesis and clarified specific desires and interests for future training and dealings with this topic. The Likert-Type scale provided good quantifiable data which is summarized in chapter 4.

This research plan provided a broad base of information and sources upon which this thesis was based. However, there were several weaknesses involved in the ability to obtain some of the required information. In phase one, several internet links to existing articles on the subject were invalid and only limited information could be obtained from the available abstract. Many of the books written on the subject were dated and, although they provided some good background information, did not specifically address the five year period in question.

Specific problems encountered in the second phase were difficulties in obtaining training curricula from the various schools once identified. Much of the courseware is not yet digitized and getting hard copies sent from the schools proved extremely difficult. The identification of training sites was a problem in, and of, itself. Since much of the Army's training is fragmented by branch, it was difficult to determine which branch taught specific aspects of the topic. This weakness in identifying and obtaining training materials from all available courses could skew the results of the final thesis. However, it may strengthen the argument that without an ability to track soldiers with these skills, the Army will never really be exactly sure what trained soldiers it currently has on hand.

Weaknesses involved in the survey phase revolve around the ability to get a wide range of responses. Although the use of the intelligence link net and contacts provided by members of the Command and General Staff Officer Course class of 2001 broadened the scope greatly, various populations were undoubtedly excluded. A specific example, because most of the survey was conducted via electronic mail, would be junior enlisted analysts. In the digital architecture associated with most military organizations, electronic mail accounts are limited. This often results in only higher ranking personnel having true access to the military electronic mail systems. Efforts were made to overcome this weakness by coordinating with various senior personnel for input from their junior analysts.

In summary, the three phase approach to the research design provided both quantifiable and quotable data for this thesis. Much of it was based on first-hand experience and is valid

and applicable to the topic at hand. The results of this research will be covered in depth in the next chapter where a full analysis of the data will be presented.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyze all data uncovered in the three phases of the research. A thorough analysis of first the cited literature, then the course curricula, and finally the survey results will be conducted. This analysis will tie together all of the research conducted for this thesis and present the supporting evidence for the conclusions to be discussed in chapter 5.

The literature review conducted in chapter 2 yielded two major categories: those authors who felt that existing IPB skills can be easily translated into MOOTW analysis skills, and those who felt that specific MOOTW analysis skills should be provided to Army analysts. The initial part of the literature review dealt with articles and books published on this topic. A review of these shows the two categories clearly.

The Villeneuve article “Intelligence and the United Nations: Lessons From Bosnia - A Canadian Experience;” the Graham article “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: Definitions and Limitations;” and the interview with the Chief of Infantry Major General John Le Moyne all addressed the need for this type of analysis, but none addressed the need for additional analytical tools. In fact, the Villeneuve article specifically stated that their intelligence cycle was “very flexible, lending itself easily to adaptation to any situation” (Villeneuve 1996, 24).

On the other hand, the Charters article “Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-Modernist Peacekeeping” which specifically calls for “a new look at intelligence requirements, sources, and methods, from a different, but not unfamiliar, perspective” (Charters

1999, 41), definitely falls into the second category. Another example of this is the Weinrod article “U.S. Intelligence Priorities in the post-Cold War Era,” which states “intelligence agencies will need to develop improved ways of detecting, assessing, and responding to potential threats posed by paramilitary forces and even civilians” (Weinrod 1996, 5). Both of these authors definitely fall into the category of thought where additional skills are needed for this type of analysis. The USPACOM report is another obvious proponent of this group with its “OOTW analysis tools are embryonic or non-existent” (Hartley 1996, 1).

The second part of the literature review dealt with existing joint and Army doctrine and regulations. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*; FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*; Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, and Joint Publication 2-03, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, all recognize the unique analytical requirements for MOOTW. When addressed, however, these regulations all refer back to variations of the standard IPB.

The third and final portion of the literature review deals with existing course curricula. The CGSOC curriculum provides a checklist of items to be considered during MOOTW analysis. This checklist is very comprehensive and investigates, in great detail, aspects required when analyzing a MOOTW scenario. CGSOC still uses the basic IPB format, however, to conduct this analysis.

The Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca is currently teaching analysts how to use a computer program called “Crime Notebook.” This is an off-the-shelf program, created

by police officers, which provides databasing and link diagramming capabilities to the analysts. This tool is basically an electronic version of association matrices, which have been taught in the past. The program provides the ability to query previous reports to conduct pattern analysis. It will also draw line and block charts which show how a group is organized thereby helping identify leaders and key links in the structure. Recognition of the necessity for upgraded tools such as this is finally hitting the training base.

The Army War College at Carlisle Barracks also teaches a block of instruction on MOOTW in their curriculum. Although it discusses more operational and strategic level involvement in MOOTW, it does admit a need for a “mindset other than traditional warfighting” (LSN 4-26, MOOTW, Army War College Curriculum Introduction Sheet).

The limited material covered in course curricula does not reflect the emphasis placed on this topic in the field. Discussions which occurred during the timeframe 10 to 12 December 2000, on the intelligence list server (INTELST) web site, provided a good feel for thoughts from professionals within the intelligence community on this topic. As this web site is nonattributional, the origins of the following quotes are not provided. However, the significant interest in this topic, plus the relationship these responses have to the two categories of thought previously identified, provides a broader insight and excellent sources for this thesis.

Many of the members of INTELST felt that current IPB was adequate. One member stated, “A good analyst who has been trained and certified in conducting multisource analysis should be able to make the intellectual leap to doing so in any environment.” The member also went on to say that neither environment nor threats “fundamentally change the way in which we

gather, process, or disseminate the information our commanders need to make good decisions.”

Another member continued this thought by stating that a soldier who has been immersed in “rudimentary skills . . . will come out of it just fine.”

Another member of the INTELST felt that “intelligence analysts earn their pay because they know the process of analysis, as a disciplined approach to synthesize information applicable to specific questions and needs determined by some commander.” The member summed up these thoughts by then stating, “The all-source professional ought to be able to drop in anywhere and, after a short ramp up, be effective.” This thought process goes along well with the current general trend in military education. This trend, restated by another member, is that, “We train for war, anything less we can perform with minimal adjustments as our warfighting skills are adaptable.”

Although these members make valid arguments, other members of INTELST felt that additional tools and skills were needed to adequately perform MOOTW analysis. “It is absolutely essential that we give our analysts the proper tools to get the job done . . . a deep understanding of the foe’s entire culture.” This statement leaves little room for doubt about this member’s convictions for additional analytical tools.

Other members of the INTELST who argue for additional MOOTW skills stated, “All of the services need to start specializing their analysts” and that a “specialized and detailed knowledge of a region/culture/people/military (i.e., “potential threat”) is a good thing.” One final comment in favor of additional emphasis was that, “The more you know about the culture, personalities, history, geography, and politics of a given area, the better your analysis.”

The discussions, as stated, fall into two categories. Unfortunately, the number of members who were for and those against additional tools and training were relatively balanced. Based on this facet alone, a conclusion cannot be made. Additional data was available in the survey as addressed below.

The final, most comprehensive section of this chapter, covers the results from the survey addressed in chapter 3. Approximately sixty surveys were disseminated to a convenience sample. Thirty-one surveys were returned. Additional time and a larger population base may have resulted in different results; however, on an exploratory analysis level, general trends and theories were apparent.

Survey analysis was conducted in four different ways using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 9.0 computer program. A descriptive analysis was conducted first on the analyst responses, then on the commanders’ responses. A third descriptive analysis was conducted on the combined responses from both analysts and commanders. The last type of analysis conducted was an analysis of variance (ANOVA) within the combined surveys. It is necessary to reiterate, because this was a convenience sample, the inferences drawn from the ANOVA data are subject to errors.

The descriptive analysis of the demographic variables of the analyst surveys was misaligned in several areas. The first graph reflects the response to the survey question: What operation were you involved in? As expected, the results were more heavily weighted toward Bosnia as shown in figure 1. 40 percent of the respondents were deployed to Bosnia and another 25 percent to Kosovo. Although a wider spectrum of respondents may not have changed the results significantly, this would be an interesting area for additional study.




Figure 1. Analyst Operations

Another area which may have misaligned results was the large percentage of respondents working in intelligence sections during their deployments. Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the responses to the survey question: What was your job description? As

figure 2 shows, a full 50 percent were involved in joint, division, or brigade-level intelligence sections (J2/G2/S2). Again, a larger population, including more civil affairs, special forces, or other analysts may have changed the outcome of this survey.




Figure 2. Analyst Job Descriptions

A broad range of ranks was represented in the analyst survey to include enlisted members, warrant officers, officers, and civilians. Figure 3 represents the percentage of the respondents answers to the survey question: What was your rank? Due to the convenience sample, however, 40 percent of the respondents were majors as shown in figure 3.




Figure 3. Analyst Ranks

The next demographic variable, which the survey covered, was the question: What date did you deploy? Although some members were deployed during periods of two different calendar years, the reported year is the one in which the member spent the majority of the deployment. Every year was represented from 1995 to 2000. The majority of deployments, 35 percent, was from 1995. The next highest representation was from 1999 with 25 percent as shown in figure 4.




Figure 4. Analyst Deployment Year

The final demographic data set within the analyst survey was nationality. This thesis is obviously based on the United States Army. The majority of respondents is from the U.S. as shown in figure 5. It was, however, interesting to get opinions from some allied respondents on the issue.




Figure 5. Analyst Nationality

Now that the demographic data has been covered for the analysts, a quick review of the types of analysis they were expected to conduct during MOOTW deployments will be covered. The graphs for the next seven questions represent responses to a Likert-type survey. There were five options for each question. The possible answers were “not-at-all,” “slight extent,” “moderate extent,” “great extent,” and “constantly.” Figure 6 represents responses to the question: To what extent did you find yourself analyzing information on areas of interest other than those normally associated with tactical military operations? As the figure depicts, 100 percent of MOOTW analysts were expected to do other types of analysis during at least a great extent of their deployments. Zero percent of respondents chose the “not-at-all” or “slight extent” options.




Figure 6. Other Areas of Analysis

Breaking down those other areas into the four categories previously identified resulted in significant trends. The first area surveyed covered the need for economic analysis. The question represented by figure 7 was: To what extent did you analyze information on the local economic situation? As figure 7 shows, a full 90 percent of Army analysts were expected to conduct economic analysis to a moderate extent or higher. Based on comments made in conjunction with these surveys, very few had more than remedial training in economics.




Figure 7. Economic Analysis Required

The next category involved political analysis. Figure 8 is the graphical representation of responses to the question: To what extent did you analyze information on the local political situation? As the graph in figure 8 portrays, this was even more prevalent than economics. A full 65 percent of respondents found themselves constantly doing political analysis with another 20 percent doing it to a great extent. There were no respondents who chose the “not-at-all” option for this question. Again, based on comments, very few analysts felt prepared for this task.




Figure 8. Political Analysis Required

Cultural and social analysis was queried next. The graph shown in figure 9 reflects the response to the question: To what extent did you analyze information on local culture and social aspects? Based on the analysts' responses to this survey, 83 percent were required to analyze these areas to a great extent or constantly. Again, there were no respondents who chose the "not-at-all" option.




Figure 9. Cultural and Social Analysis Required

The final category queried involved religious impacts on the situation. Figure 10 reflects responses to the question: To what extent did you analyze information on religious impacts? Although fewer analysts found themselves constantly doing this type of analysis, the numbers for great extent, 45 percent, and moderate extent, 35 percent, still bear the obvious necessity for these skills.




Figure 10. Religious Analysis Required

The final two questions on the analyst survey involved how satisfied the analysts were with their training prior to deployment and how much they feel the Army should emphasize MOOTW analysis training now that their deployments are over. Interestingly enough, none of the analysts felt that their skills were constantly sufficient to conduct the analysis their commanders needed. In fact, a full 68.4 percent felt that their skills were, at best, moderate. Figure 11 reflects responses to the question: To what extent did you feel that you had the skills necessary to do these types of analysis? Note on this chart that there were no respondents who chose the “constantly” or “not-at-all” options.




Figure 11. Analytical Skills Satisfaction

Based on the previous answer, the fact that all of the analysts feel the Army needs to place at least a moderate emphasis on training these skills is not surprising. The chart in figure 12 shows the percentage of answers to the survey question: To what extent do you feel the army should place emphasis on analysis of MOOTW? One-half of the analysts felt that a great extent of emphasis was needed. There were no responses for “not-at-all” or “slight extent.” This is a significant change to what is currently being taught in military curricula throughout the Army.




Figure 12. Army Emphasis Needed

In order to get a full appreciation for this issue it was essential to get feedback from the commanders who were using the analysis. The commanders' survey was laid out in the same basic format as the analysts' survey. As previously discussed, the demographic data will be covered first.

The operations for which commanders responded were greatly misaligned. Figure 13 is a graphical representation of the responses received to the survey question: What operation were you involved in? As depicted, 54 percent of the respondents served in Bosnia.




Figure 13. Commanders' Operations

Very few command respondents were available in the convenience sample at other than company level. The majority of respondents was students at the Command and General Staff Officer Course, so therefore, had recently served in company command roles. Although this may have misaligned the results a bit, it is interesting to note that the analysis does indeed reach these commanders at the lowest level. Figure 14 depicts responses to the survey question: At what level did you command?




Figure 14. Level of Command

As with the analyst responses, the majority of the population was at the rank of major. This again depicts the convenience sample being primarily from the Command and General Staff Officer Course population. Figure 15 depicts commander ranks with approximately 73 percent being majors and portrays the graphical responses to the question: What is your rank?




Figure 15. Commanders' Rank

Unlike the analysts, who showed the greatest deployment rates in 1995, the majority of command respondents were deployed in 1996. The second largest response came from 1999. Figure 16 portrays the responses to the question: What date did you deploy? As with the analysts, several respondents were deployed over two calendar years. The year used for this survey was the one in which the majority of the respondents deployment was covered.




Figure 16. Command Deployment Year

Many of our NATO and SFOR allies rely on U.S. analysts to conduct their MOOTW missions. It was interesting, therefore, to acquire some multinational comments on the issue from the command side. Figure 17 reflects the nationality of respondents. As expected, the majority was from the U.S.




Figure 17. Commander Nationality

On the command survey, the question for figure 18 was worded: To what extent did you need intelligence on areas of interest other than those normally associated with tactical military operations to command your unit? The choices, as in the analyst survey, were “not-at-all,” “slight extent,” “moderate extent,” “great extent,” and “constantly.” As can be seen from the responses, approximately 82 percent of the commanders found themselves needing other categories of intelligence to a great extent or higher. None of the commanders responded with “slight extent” or “not-at-all.”




Figure 18. Need for Other Areas of Intelligence

Responses to the component areas were slightly different. In the economic arena, commanders seemed to have less of a need. Figure 19 reflects responses to the question: To what extent did you need intelligence on the local economic situation? The greatest majority, 36.4 percent, had only a slight need for economic intelligence. Zero percent of the respondents chose the “not-at-all” option.




Figure 19. Need for Economic Intelligence

The commanders' need for political intelligence, on the other hand, was quite high. The chart at figure 20 shows a graphical representation of responses to the question: To what extent did you need intelligence on the local political situation? A full 89 percent of the respondents needed political intelligence to a great extent or constantly. Again, none of the commanders took the "not-at-all" option.




Figure 20. Need for Political Intelligence

In the areas of cultural and social intelligence need, it seems the commanders were split. Figure 21 portrays responses to the question: To what extent did you need intelligence on local culture and social aspects? Although the majority, 45.5 percent, felt they needed this type of intelligence constantly, a very high number, 36.4 percent, only felt they had a moderate need. None of the respondents selected the “slight extent” or “not-at-all” options.




Figure 21. Need for Cultural and Social Intelligence

The final of the four categories is religious. Figure 22 depicts the responses to the question: To what extent did you need intelligence on religious impacts? This category, although widely dispersed, also had the majority constantly needing intelligence and none selecting “not-at-all.”




Figure 22. Need for Religious Intelligence

The final two questions addressed the level of satisfaction with the intelligence received and the level of emphasis, which the Army should currently place on MOOTW analysis training. Although one commander was not-at-all satisfied with the analytical support he received, the majority of the respondents was either moderately or greatly satisfied. None of the commanders were constantly satisfied with the support they received from their analysts, nor did they chose “slight extent.” Figure 23 shows the percentage of responses to the question: How satisfied were you with the intelligence community’s ability to provide you with required information in a complete and timely manner?




Figure 23. Satisfaction with Intelligence Provided

Figure 24, the final question from the commanders’ survey, portrays the responses to

the question: To what extent do you feel the Army should place emphasis on analysis of MOOTW? Although 45.5 percent of the commanders were satisfied to a great extent with the intelligence they received, 63 percent feel the Army needs to place a great extent of emphasis on training these skills. There were no “not-at-all,” “slight extent,” or “constantly” responses.




Figure 24. Army Emphasis Needed

The next section of this chapter will cover the results from both the commander and analyst surveys combined. As before, the demographic data will be covered first. As figure 25 depicts, there was a one-third, two-thirds ratio on command vice analyst responses.




Figure 25. Command Vice Analyst Responses

As expected, the combined operation responses are mainly from Bosnia. Figure 26 represents the responses from both the commanders and analysts to the question: What operation were you involved in?




Figure 26. Combined Operations

This next chart, figure 27, shows the wide variety of jobs held by the combined respondents during MOOTW deployments. This is the graphic portrayal of the responses from both commanders and analysts to the question: What was your job?




Figure 27. Combined Job Descriptions

The combined ranks, although covering a broad range, are definitely greater at the major level. This again is a result of the convenience sample. Figure 28 depicts the combined responses from commanders and analysts to the question: What is your rank?




Figure 28. Combined Ranks

Combining the results from the command and analysts surveys resulted in a much more equitable distribution of deployment years. Figure 29 portrays the deployment years for both commanders and analysts in response to the question: What date did you deploy? As for the commander and analyst individual survey responses, if a respondent was deployed during parts of two calendar years, the majority of the deployment was the year listed.




Figure 29 Combined Deployment Years

The combined nationality chart, as expected, is primarily U.S. The wide range of allies responding to both surveys, however, shows the multinational interest in this topic.




Figure 30. Combined Nationalities

Commanders and analysts seemed to be in agreement that other types of analysis are necessary during MOOTW. Figure 31 portrays the combined responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (find yourself analyzing) intelligence on areas of interest other than those normally associated with tactical military operations? As this chart shows, 64 percent felt a constant need for MOOTW specific analysis. None of the respondents selected “not-at-all” or “slight extent.”




Figure 31. Combined Need for Other Areas of Analysis

Figure 32 depicts the combined responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on the local economic situation? Of the combined respondents 48.4 percent felt a great need for economic analysis and intelligence.




Figure 32. Combined Economic Need

The political arena was, by far, the largest requirement. Figure 33 depicts the commanders' and analysts' responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on the local political situation? As shown here, 54.8 percent required political analysis and intelligence constantly and none selected the “not-at-all” option.




Figure 33. Combined Political Need

Figure 34 portrays the combined responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on local cultural and social aspects? Cultural and social intelligence and analysis were required to a great extent or constantly by 73 percent of the combined respondents. None of the respondents selected the “not-at-all” option.




Figure 34. Combined Cultural and Social Need

Figure 35 shows the commanders' and analysts' responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on religious impacts? The combined survey showed a lesser need for religious intelligence, however, 38.7 percent of the respondents still felt it was needed to a great extent.




Figure 35. Combined Religious Need

Figure 36 portrays the combined responses to two similar questions. For the analysts the question was worded: To what extent did you feel that you had the skills necessary to do these types of analysis? For the commanders the question was worded: How satisfied were you with the intelligence community's ability to provided you with required information in a

complete and timely manner? The majority, or 56 percent of combined respondents was only moderately satisfied with analytical skills and products. None of the respondents were “constantly” satisfied.




Figure 36. Combined Skills Satisfaction

All respondents felt the Army needed to emphasize MOOTW analysis skills. Figure 37 shows the combined responses to the question: To what extent do you feel the Army should place emphasis on analysis of MOOTW? Of the respondents 54.8 percent felt that this emphasis should be to a great extent. None of the respondents selected “slight extent,” or “not-at-all.”




Figure 37. Combined Army Emphasis Needed

In a comparison of the commanders' and analysts' responses, several interesting trends were observed. First, analysts felt a greater need to analyze "other than tactical data" more than commanders felt they needed it. This could result from the analysts' relative feelings of being unprepared to accomplish the MOOTW analysis. This would cause the analysts to place a greater emphasis on MOOTW vice tactical analysis.

The following ANOVA charts show a comparison between responses of commanders (solid line) and analysts (dotted line). Figure 38 depicts responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on areas of interest other than those normally associated with tactical military operations? This question was the only one that showed statistical significance between the commanders and analysts with $p=.038$.




Figure 38. Other Areas of Interest ANOVA

Although none of the following ANOVA charts represented statistical significance, they are a good indication of general trends. In the economic category, analysts felt a greater need for economic analysis than the commanders did. Figure 39 portrays the comparison between commanders' and analysts' responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on the local economic situation?




Figure 39. Economic ANOVA

The political category, although emphasized by both groups, was deemed a bit more important by the analysts. Figure 40 compares the percentage of responses from the commanders and analysts from both groups to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on the local political situation?




Figure 40. Political ANOVA

Cultural and social aspects were areas in which commanders seemed to place more emphasis than the analysts. This is apparent in figure 41, which depicts the responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on local culture and social aspects?




Figure 41. Cultural and Social ANOVA

The religious analysis also appears to be more important to the commanders than to the analysts. Figure 42 compares the responses to the question: To what extent did you (need) (analyze) intelligence on religious impacts?




Figure 42. Religious ANOVA

The final two areas, skills satisfaction and Army emphasis, have the greatest agreement between both the analysts and commanders. In figure 43 a very close correlation exists between commanders' and analysts' responses. The analyst question was: To what extent did you feel that you had the skills necessary to do these types of analysis? The commander question was: How satisfied were you with the intelligence community's ability to provide you with required information in a complete and timely manner?




Figure 43. Skills Satisfaction ANOVA

The final question involving how much emphasis the Army should place on training MOOTW analysis skills is an obvious point of agreement for both commanders and analysts. As the chart in figure 44 depicts, the majority of respondents felt that a great extent of emphasis

must be placed on MOOTW analysis skills training. This was in response to the question: To what extent do you feel the Army should place emphasis on analysis of MOOTW?




Figure 44. Army Emphasis ANOVA

The final section of this chapter will cover nonquantifiable survey responses from both

commanders and analysts. Their additional thoughts on this topic also basically formed two categories. This section will look at the analysts' comments first and then the commanders' comments. The survey was on a nonattributional basis so sources are not identified for the quotes.

The number of analysts who felt that the current IPB process is sufficient was only slightly smaller than those that felt the Army needed a new process. One analyst stated that "the role of intelligence in MOOTW is essentially the same as in a MTW [major theater war] -- parallel the thinking of the commander in order to answer and anticipate his information requirements." Another analyst felt that "the Army should not focus on analysis in support of MOOTW versus combat operations, but on providing its analysts with the ability to develop a well thought-out, logically developed product that supports the commanders intelligence requirements. The mental tools required to analyze information are virtually the same." Along these same lines, another analyst felt, "it's not just MOOTW analysis emphasis that is needed-- it is analysis in general. The sorts of analytical skills that make a good tactical intelligence officer can also make a good MOOTW analyst."

Additional comments that support this position came from several other analysts. One wrote, "It is the analysis skills that are important, not whether we are analyzing MOOTW types of information vice military information. In my mind, analysis is analysis, no matter what type." Another analyst felt that the Army needed to "tap the expertise of true subject matter experts in the areas of politics, religion, economics, crime, banking, criminal science, law, etc." He envisioned creating "a plug, not unlike the NIST [National Intelligence Support Team] concept

to cover these functions.” (The NIST is usually a strategic-level team of experts, which is placed in a new theater to provide intelligence support to the commander until his own intelligence section is prepared to assume the mission.) This suggestion may be a viable solution to the problem; however, it would require management at the strategic level of the Department of Defense.

One analyst felt the existing METT-TC was all that was needed to conduct analysis in a MOOTW environment. He stated that, “MOOTW uses the base thinking of conventional analysis . . . METT-T [sic] applies.” The final quote from analysts, which felt that existing tools were enough, stated that “Current MOOTW analytical tools taught in the school house (association matrix, etc.) can be very helpful if used correctly.” This analyst did not elaborate on whether he felt the training was acceptable on the correct use of these tools. Although all these analysts were satisfied with existing tools, a slightly greater number of respondents were not.

A slight majority existed of analysts who felt additional training and tools were needed. One stated, “There is clearly a specific training requirement.” Another reported that the “school house didn’t help much . . . learned as I went.” One of the international respondents stated “PKO [peacekeeping operations] are not a priority, therefore people are not prepared to deal with the different characteristics on the ground, or with the information required to deal with the situation.” He went on to say that some of the lessons learned from his army’s experiences were that “the MDMP [military decision making process], information procedures, etc. should be adjusted to be used both in PKO and in disaster relief environments.” He also stated that his

country now has a PKO school where they send analysts slated for deployment on MOOTW missions.

One analyst was particularly challenged by the requirement to develop “link analysis and association matrices” to “manipulate complex tribe and clan interactions.” Without previous training on any of these areas, he felt that “intelligence support to force protection was almost impossible.” As force protection is a major factor of any MOOTW mission, this admission is disturbing to say the least.

Another analyst stated outright, “I received little to none” in reference to training for MOOTW deployments. He went on to report that his most difficult task was “trying to determine a pattern from the random violence.” His section developed what they called a “crime information fusion cell.” Due to a lack of training, however, they “never did determine a pattern or effectively develop a system for predicting future violence.”

One of the respondents, who reported no official schooling, found himself working in a counterdrug operation. He stated that the majority of his “information dealt with link analysis, trend and pattern analysis and various IPB products associated with a modified MOOTW IPB.” The same analyst was also involved in the Balkans where he reports dealing with “trend and pattern analysis, case studies, application of ROE [rules of engagement], personalities, intelligence requirements and information dissemination.” Basically his experiences involved learning as he went and doing analysis by trial and error.

A succinct summation was provided by another of the analysts when he wrote “MOOTW is the reality we face as intelligence professionals and not preparing our soldiers and

leaders for it simply leads to failure. Best case, that means embarrassment . . . worst case, lack of ability to perform in a MOOTW environment will lead to the loss or death of a soldier.” He went on to state that although he felt prepared by four years of expertise in his arena, that with most analysts “that is seldom the case.”

In the opinion of another analyst, “The operations that the U.S. will be involved in for the next ten years will be like Bosnia and Kosovo and it is imperative that we train our intel folks to be multi-functional (meaning looking at more than just traditional force structure, equipment and TTP’s [tactics, techniques and procedures]) analysts.” He went on to say that “They need to be able to be tactical and strategic analysts all rolled into one nice package.” One final respondent felt that “analysis of MOOTW should not be done at the expense of training for high-intensity combat, but it must be approached separately.” There is no doubt that these analysts believe more training is required.

A review of the qualitative input from the commanders shows almost two-thirds in favor of additional training in MOOTW specific skills. Several of the commanders, however, were satisfied with the analytical support they received. One commander felt that “we spend entirely too much time training to fight the ‘red threat’ world class OPFOR [opposing force] and not enough time exercising real OPLAN’s with real threats and challenges.” The commander went on to say, however, that the Army possesses the skills to analyze these environments, “We just need practice to reinforce the application of them.” Another commander felt that all that was really needed was “situational awareness in a non-linear environment.” The commander felt that

this type of awareness required no additional training above and beyond what is commonly expected from a staff.

The last quote from a respondent who felt additional training was not necessary, stated, “I believe the best training is still in conventional operations using IPB.” He went on to explain that “a new range of factors can be introduced for a specific theater or operation.” He felt that because the factors vary significantly from theater to theater, it would be impossible to try and train a MOOTW analyst who could be successful everywhere. Although these commanders based their responses on personal experience, the majority of commanders felt differently.

One commander was very concise in the statement that, “The schoolhouse does a very poor job at developing the thinking skills required to be a successful MOOTW analyst.” Another commander felt that MOOTW skills needed to be trained at a basic level to all his soldiers. He reports that “most intel came from talking to villagers.” He went on to say that this was “done by all soldiers, at all levels” and that the longer a soldier served in one area, and the better he got to know the people, the more information was gleaned. A field artillery commander also agreed that all soldiers should be trained. He found his unit deployed “not to provide fire support, but to serve in an S5 [civil-military] capacity.” He felt that his “fire supporters did a great job serving in a role which was not even close to their MOS.” He also felt that “pre-deployment training was critical to their success.”

A senior commander stated, “The need for sound intelligence on which to base operational decisions in these [MOOTW] complex environments is absolutely critical.” He then went on to say that he “found that even the best of intel staffs become challenged in an

environment where social, political, economic, and religious issues matter as much as military ones. I fully support any effort that goes after acquiring and sustaining intelligence skill sets that are rapidly adaptable to the missions we find at the center of the spectrum.” Another commander, feeling that “warfare and military conflict have a much more human dimension,” took it a step further by saying the Army needs these capabilities “not only in MOOTW, but also in mid and high intensity conflict situations as well.” Strong arguments can be made for both cases.

After reviewing the literature, curricula, and survey results, the two categories are more fully apparent than before. Should the Army’s existing training, IPB, and MDMP be considered an adequate framework upon which to base MOOTW analysis for the future? Does the Army need to train additional skill sets to provide better analytical tools for MOOTW missions? Should the Army emphasize training and identification of those trained to perform this type of analysis? Based on the analysis presented in this chapter, these questions and the overall thesis question, Should the Army have a MOOTW ASI? will be answered in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis originated with the question: Should the Army have an ASI for MOOTW analysts? As the research portrayed, this topic is not only relevant, but in many cases controversial. This chapter summarizes the findings and answers the questions posed in the previous chapters. Areas for future study within the MOOTW analysis arena are also identified. Although many things change over time, the requirement to conduct MOOTW analysis is unlikely to dissipate over the next century.

The secondary and tertiary questions identified must be addressed prior to answering the thesis question. The initial tertiary question asked if the four categories of economic, political, cultural and social, and religious aspects adequately addressed MOOTW analysis needs. Based on the responses received from the surveys, this question would be answered in the affirmative. The next tertiary question dealt with the need for additional categories such as history or language. This directly ties to the previous question. Although it is necessary for some to have language skills in the identified area of operations, this is not a requirement for analyzing data. Good translators are obviously needed for source material in the target language, however, the linguists are not expected to deem the significance of what they are translating. As far as historical issues are concerned, items of great historical significance are already incorporated into social and cultural traditions. Holidays, holy days and festivals are all examples of recognizing events of historical significance. Although an understanding of the

history of a region can sometimes improve an understanding of current events, it can also skew analysis into expected patterns. Application of historical tendencies to current events may lead to the wrong conclusions, particularly if the population is learning from historical successes and failures and applying new logic to current problems.

The final tertiary question also addresses the categories of MOOTW analysis. This question asked if full analysis could be conducted without considering religious and social aspects. Data from the surveys give a definite negative to this question. A full 83.8 percent of combined respondents had a moderate need or greater for religious intelligence and 90.3 percent for social and cultural intelligence. These figures would indicate that any attempt to leave out either of these categories would leave significant gaps in understanding of the area of operations.

Having addressed the necessity for analysis of these four categories, the secondary questions can now be addressed. The initial secondary question asked about the extent to which this type of analysis is trained. Upon reviewing curricula from identified military schools, the research shows that the only logical response to this question is “not much.” As previously addressed, blocks of training on MOOTW analysis are extremely brief in comparison with conventional tactical analysis training. The introduction of such tools as Crime Notebook and MOOTW checklists are a step in the right direction, however, the disparity of emphasis is obvious. The Army spends the majority of its time operating in a MOOTW environment and training for a conventional one.

The next secondary question asked how many soldiers already possess MOOTW analysis skills. This question is very difficult to answer. The analysts who deployed on MOOTW missions have acquired some skills through experience. The ability to readily identify other soldiers who have political and economic analytical backgrounds is not currently inherent in the system. The Army has a system for tracking foreign area officers who have cultural, social and religious understanding of an area, as well as linguists who can speak the basic language. These basic capabilities of foreign area officers however, were outweighed by a full 54.8 percent of combined respondents who felt they needed political intelligence on a constant basis.

The next secondary question asked if all analysts should be trained. A quick look at manning figures in this smaller army, and the greatly increased number of MOOTW-type deployments which have occurred over the past five years makes the answer obvious. All analysts must have a basic understanding of MOOTW analysis. Even if they do not deploy, they may very well find themselves supporting a deployed unit in a split-based operation. In this post Cold-war period, the chances of conventional, force-on-force operations are decreasing while MOOTW deployments continue to be the major operational requirement for the Army. Every analyst must therefore be able to provide MOOTW analysis to their commanders.

The next question expanded this requirement somewhat by asking if all soldiers going on MOOTW deployments should understand these nonmilitary aspects. Based on survey qualitative responses, this question must also be answered in the affirmative. There were three good examples of this need. The first was the field artillery commander whose troops were

required to work civil affairs missions. The second example was the foreign officer who reported getting most of his intelligence from the soldiers who were out talking to the population. Even Major General Le Moyne, who stated that “the military needs to improve its human intelligence capabilities so that commanders and troops are familiar with the peoples and cultures of the cities in which they are fighting” (Naylor 2000) agreed with this need.

The next secondary question asked if the Army needed a minimal number of experts who could train those with a “need to know.” The research and conclusions to this point have clearly indicated that everyone has a need to know. A minimal number of experts would quickly be overwhelmed. This obviously needs to be fully indoctrinated into the training base at every level. This ties in to the final secondary question which asks if privates and specialists, who may be assigned to the ACT in the IBCT, also need to understand these aspects. The requirements portrayed by the commanders for this type of analysis also require an affirmative response to this question.

The last question posed in chapter 1, other than the thesis question, was why the Army continues to focus training on the conventional enemy when most missions no longer stress purely military operations. The answer to this question reflects the responses of the group previously identified who believes that the current IPB and MDMP tools are sufficient and flexible enough to be applied in any situation. Many doctrine and curricula writers are of this group. The Army has experienced success in the past with these tools. As the popular saying goes “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it.” Unfortunately, the world and military requirements are

changing. These changes must be identified and incorporated before the next major trial, not as lessons learned after the Army has failed.

Prior to answering the thesis question, this chapter will address other questions posed in previous chapters. The literature review in chapter 2 resulted in three stated questions. The first was why the Army has not done something to formalize this MOOTW analysis requirement. This question was based on the 1996 *World Affairs* article which stated, “Intelligence agencies will need to develop improved ways of detecting, assessing, and responding to potential threats posed by paramilitary forces and even civilians” (Weinrod 1996, 5). The need has been identified, based on this article, for at least five years. Perhaps the Army hierarchy is satisfied with the foreign area officers and linguists it already has identified and trained. This research, however, obviously displays the need for additional analysis in the political and economic arenas (the key factors behind the article’s paramilitary forces and civilians). These requirements must now be recognized to be as vital as those previously performed by these other specialists.

Operation Uphold Democracy lessons learned included the need for developing political-military plans in complete coordination with the military planning process. The next question posed by the literature review was how the Army could possibly create political-military plans without understanding the political aspects of the country in which the Army was operating. This is obviously a rhetorical question further emphasizing that it would be impossible to do one without the other. This does, however, pertain to the political-military nature of current and future operations.

The final question raised by the literature review concerned the level of competence displayed by analysts involved in MOOTW. This question was adequately answered by the quantifiable survey results. The majority, 51.6 percent, of combined respondents reported that analytical skills were only satisfactory to a moderate extent. This does not seem to be a strong vote in favor of what is currently being taught to our analysts.

Chapter 3, methodology, did not produce any additional questions. The analysis in chapter 4, however, resulted in three questions which must be addressed prior to responding to the central issue of this thesis. The first question, which stemmed from the analysis phase, was whether existing training, IPB, and the analytical products inputted into the MDMP can be considered an adequate framework for MOOTW. Based on new tools such as Crime Notebook and MOOTW checklists, which are currently being taught, the accepted answer to this question must be “no.” The training base has obviously recognized that the Army does, in fact, need additional tools and skills to conduct MOOTW analysis.

The second question from the analysis section queried, Does the Army need to train additional skill sets for MOOTW analysis? This ties directly to the previous question. The need for political and economic analysis, as portrayed by the survey, justifies the need for these additional skill sets. Although the Crime Notebook and association matrices can help track political contacts, there is nothing currently taught in discovered curricula which reflect instruction in economic analysis.

Should the Army emphasize training of MOOTW analysis? This final question from chapter 4 can also be answered by the survey results. All of the combined survey respondents

to this question concluded that the Army must emphasize this training to a moderate extent or greater. In fact, the majority, 54.8 percent, responded that the Army should emphasize this training to a great extent. These statistics, from commanders and analysts who are actually out there accomplishing the mission, speak for themselves.

The solution to this problem is not short-term. There will be no quick fixes and major changes will have to occur in the training base at every level to truly train MOOTW analysis to the levels which commanders desire. The training must be widespread with every soldier having a need to understand the nonmilitary aspects of MOOTW. Every analyst must have at least a minimal foundation in economic, political, social and cultural, and religious analysis. Until that is accomplished to the point that commanders can depend on every analyst to accomplish the MOOTW mission, an ASI is probably appropriate.

Should the Army have an ASI for MOOTW analysts? In the interim, the research supports an affirmative response to that question. An ASI would provide commanders with a quick way to identify which analysts can readily accomplish the mission, and perhaps act as subject matter experts to those who do not have these skills. Eventually, when all analysts are being trained, the ASI requirement would become a moot point.

This topic can, and should, be expanded upon with additional study. Further research is essential to validate survey responses as a convenience sample was used for this thesis. A much larger, Army-wide, population of survey respondents may lead to more significant findings. Moreover, as additional analysts are deployed on MOOTW missions, secondary tools and skill sets will be identified. As the Army continues to enter the information age, more of these tools

will undoubtedly be digital. These new programs, however, will never replace analysts. On the contrary, digitization will increase the amount of data which requires analysis, and the expectations from commanders will be for even greater fidelity. Therefore, analysts must not only be able to accomplish basic analysis, but must acquire the technical skills to interact with the new programs.

An accessory topic to this thesis would be to discern an ASI producing curriculum for a MOOTW analyst. Identifying exactly what a MOOTW analyst should know or be able to do would become a thesis in itself. Additional considerations for this topic would be who should have executive oversight of the program and how it should be applied across the different services and agencies.

Further studies could also be done on the possibility of producing a NIST-type organization which could rapidly deploy to fill gaps in MOOTW analysis capabilities of standard Army organizations. This study could address what members would make-up the team, what skills they would possess, and what level of command they would support. This concept could also be an interim solution to training all analysts in MOOTW analysis skills.

In summary, the Army should have an interim ASI to identify MOOTW analysts. This is one quick way for commanders to easily identify and utilize the skills of their personnel in a MOOTW environment. Until additional personnel are trained and readily available to commanders at all levels, an ASI just makes sense.

APPENDIX A

ANALYST SURVEY

The purpose of this survey is to ascertain the level of confidence experienced by intelligence analysts during MOOTW activities between 1995 and the present. The administrative data is for tracking purposes only...the survey is completely nonattributional.

Please fill in the blanks for questions 1-5.

- 1) What is your name, rank and branch? _____
- 2) What operation were you involved in? _____
- 3) What date did you deploy (Month/Year)? _____
- 4) What date did you return (Month/Year)? _____
- 5) What was your job description? _____

Please respond by selecting the best choice for the following questions.

- 6) To what extent did you find yourself analyzing information on areas of interest other than those normally associated with tactical military operations?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

If you answered "Not at All" please go to question # 12. If you answered any other way, continue with question #7.

- 7) To what extent did you analyze information on the local economic situation?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

- 8) To what extent did you analyze information on the local political situation?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

- 9) To what extent did you analyze information on local culture/social aspects?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

10) To what extent did you analyze information on religious impacts?

Not at All____Slight Extent____Moderate Extent____Great Extent____Constantly____

11) To what extent did you feel that you had the skills necessary to do these types of analysis?

Not at All____Slight Extent____Moderate Extent____Great Extent____Constantly____

12) To what extent do you feel the Army should place emphasis on analysis of MOOTW?

Not at All____Slight Extent____Moderate Extent____Great Extent____Constantly____

I would appreciate any additional comments you can provide in relation to this topic. (I am especially interested in what types of information you had to analyze during your MOOTW operation and how well prepared, through previous experience/schooling you felt to accomplish your mission.)

Comments:_____

In order to reach the greatest number of analysts, I would appreciate it if you could tell me who other analysts in your MOOTW organization were that could provide feedback on this topic?

If you have phone numbers, units or email addresses, I would appreciate the assistance, however, just full name and rank will suffice.

Other Analysts:_____

Thank you for your cooperation.

APPENDIX B

COMMANDER SURVEY

The purpose of this survey is to ascertain the level of intelligence support received during MOOTW activities between 1995 and the present. The administrative data is for tracking purposes only...the survey is completely nonattributinal.

Please fill in the blanks for questions 1-5.

- 1) What is your name, rank and branch? _____
- 2) What operation where you involved in? _____
- 3) What date did you deploy (Month/Year)? _____
- 4) What date did you return (Month/Year)? _____
- 5) At what level did you command? _____

Please respond by selecting the best choice for the following questions.

- 6) To what extent did you need intelligence on areas of interest other than those normally associated with tactical military operations to command your unit?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

If you answered "Not at All" please go to question # 11. If you answered any other way, continue with question #7.

- 7) To what extent did you need intelligence on the local economic situation?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

- 8) To what extent did you need intelligence on the local political situation?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

- 9) To what extent did you need intelligence on local culture/social aspects?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

- 10) To what extent did you need intelligence on religious impacts?

Not at All _____ Slight Extent _____ Moderate Extent _____ Great Extent _____ Constantly _____

11) How satisfied were you with the intelligence communities ability to provide you with required information in a complete and timely manner?

Very Dissatisfied__Dissatisfied__Somewhat Satisfied__Satisfied__ Very Satisfied__

12) To what extent do you feel the Army should place emphasis on analysis of MOOTW?

Not at All____Slight Extent____Moderate Extent____Great Extent____Constantly____

I would appreciate any additional comments you can provide in relation to this topic. (I am especially interested in what types of intelligence you needed during your MOOTW operation and how well your intel staff supported you.)

Comments:_____

In order to reach the greatest number of commanders, I would appreciate it if you could tell me who other commanders in your MOOTW organization were that could provide feedback on this topic? If you have phone numbers, units or email addresses for these officers, I would appreciate the assistance, however, just name and rank will suffice.

Other Commanders:

Thank you for your cooperation.

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